Mather v. Bowen, Franklin Court of Appeal (1997)
Parties: Karen Mather v. Bowen
Jurisdiction: Franklin Court of Appeal (1997)
Facts:
The plaintiff is Karen Mather and the defendant William Bowen. The plaintiff, Karen Mather, is allegedly suing to get her broker’s fee owed to her by William Bowen’s commercial real property. Karen Mather is a registered real estate broker and William Bowen is the property owner. Two years’ prior, Mather had been in attendance in a real estate showcase to petition real estate brokers to get tenants for the estate for a ten-year lease. Mr. Bowen made an offer to the brokers including the proposed commission upon bringing successful lessee. That same year, the plaintiff brought in a client, CRC, who ended up making a written offer naming William Bowen as the broker and CRC as potential lessee. Prior to the lease deliberations between William Bowen and CRC, Bowen had confirmed to Karen Mather on phone, before the meet up between William Bowen and CRC, which would be entitled to the broker’s fee if the client, CRC, got in to a contractual lessee agreement with William Bowen. So, Mather brought a suit against William Bowen arguing breach of contract as the brochure and the registration form collectively constituted a written contract under which Bowen owes Mather a commission. Karen Mather also alleged that CRC obstructed the financial and contractual agreement between Mather and Bowen. The defendant suppressed the motion upon which Karen Mather filed an appeal motion in Franklin court of appeal.
Issue (s):
This case constitutes an appeal case breach of contract. The Franklin court of appeal sought to decide whether the case satisfied the statute of fraud. The documents including the brochure, registration form and Bowen’s signature on the registration form sufficiently satisfy the subscription requirements. The court considers as there was no other motive why Bowen registered CRC as a possible tenant, and then the documents and writings certify the intrusion that Bowen sanctioned Mather to obtain CRC as a property tenant. The tort of interference with possible financial gain is not reliant on agreement with the fraud statute.
Rule:
The court decided that the allegations satisfied a cause of action on interference with possible fiscal gain. The Franklin Civil Code stipulates that agreements that authorize brokers to compensate or commission towards the sale-purchase of real estate are unenforceable unless the following are met. (1), it is in writing and (2) the party charged must have signed it. On the issue of breach of contract by Bowen on the refusal to pay brokerage fee, the court ruled that there was no other motive why Bowen registered CRC as a possible tenant, and then the documents and writings certify the intrusion that Bowen sanctioned Mather to obtain CRC as a property tenant. Based on this, the court ruled that the fraud statute was not met by the writings, due to the fact that it was not prescribed to the accused.
Application:
On the issue of breach of contract, the court applied the Franklin statute of fraud. The defendant, William Bowen, argued Philip v. Carter Industries but did not apply as the latter were founded on contractual written agreement that was from a broker to client and not vice versa. On the issue of CRC interference with Mather’s contract with Bowen with economical gain, the court referenced Howard v. Youngman.
Holding:
The court held that, even though even though the two torts on the two issues are unique, some plaintiffs may be able to argue both torts as cause of action. The holding noted by the court in this case was that if a plaintiff believes that there is a contract but still recognizes the fact that it can be concluded otherwise based on trier of fact, two tort actions can be raised separately. With Bowen having had Mather register as a tenant in SRC, those writings provide the inference that Bowen legitimately allowed Mather to procure the property as a tenant. Therefore, the ruling was that there was substantial evidence indicating Bowen breached the contract and it required a course of action.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that Mather pleaded both theories in the alternative and will consider each claim against CRC in turn. CRC moved to dismiss the decision by the court arguing that there was no valid and existing contract between Bowen and Mather. The trial court’s decision of removal is overturned and the case is remanded for additional proceedings. A common tort law asserts that an offender deliberately sought and led the third party to breach its contract with the accuser leading to damages for the accuser. The Tortious interference is a well-known tort permitting a claim for damages against a defendant who wrongfully in existence to chastise a commercial competitor who harms your company by interfering with its corporate associations. In Mather v. Bowen, the Plaintiff-Karen Mather alleged that the defendant entered a contractual agreement by actively soliciting real estate brokers. Upon finding a potential client, CRC, to enter in a ten-year lease with the defendant, the plaintiff claims to have contractual right to be paid by the defendant. Also, the plaintiff argues that CRC altered the financial contractual agreement and thus also sues them on the same.
Whether Mather's interference of contractual relation claims against CRC could withstand a motion to Dismiss?
The case against CRC by the plaintiff on the basis of interference with a fiscal contractual agreement could stand. Tort allegations may be deliberate or negligent. An intended tort needs evidence that the defendant projected to make assumed injury to the plaintiff, or knew that damage was probably to cause from their actions. A common law tort asserts that a defendant deliberately persuaded or makes a third party to infringe its contract with the plaintiff which caused damages to the plaintiff. Tortious intrusion is a common law tort permitting a claim for damages against a defendant who illegally inhibits with the accuser's votive or commercial relations. The lack of any justification for the defendant to convince such a breach may not constitute a breach.
The needed elements for a tortious contractual intrusion entails
(1) the presence of a lawful and enforceable contract between plaintiff and another;
(2) defendant’s cognizance of the contractual association;
(3) defendant’s deliberate and unwarranted stimulus of a breach of the contract; (4) a succeeding breach by the other induced by defendant’s unjust behavior; and (5) damages. The plaintiff is right to sue for tortious intrusion with a contract or corporate expectation in majority of the cases.
At common law, a defendant is accountable to reimburse damages in tort for activities planned to obstruct the complainant's pledged relationships with a third party. In an intended interference assertion, the liability is on the accuser to ascertain the fundamentals of the entitlement instead of on the offender to demonstrate that its actions were defensible. To triumph on the claim, the aforementioned elements must be present.
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